The Protection of Data in our Digital Age by Andrew, Tettenborn
 Cronfa -  Swansea University Open Access Repository
   
_____________________________________________________________
   
This is an author produced version of a paper published in:
Journal of Business Law
                                     
   
Cronfa URL for this paper:
http://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa32489
_____________________________________________________________
 
Paper:
Tettenborn, A., Beale, A. & Ratcliffe, S. (2017).  The Protection of Data in our Digital Age. Journal of Business Law, 6,
461-472.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________
  
This item is brought to you by Swansea University. Any person downloading material is agreeing to abide by the terms
of the repository licence. Copies of full text items may be used or reproduced in any format or medium, without prior
permission for personal research or study, educational or non-commercial purposes only. The copyright for any work
remains with the original author unless otherwise specified. The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium
without the formal permission of the copyright holder.
 
Permission for multiple reproductions should be obtained from the original author.
 
Authors are personally responsible for adhering to copyright and publisher restrictions when uploading content to the
repository.
 
http://www.swansea.ac.uk/library/researchsupport/ris-support/ 
  
1 
The Protection of Data in our Digital Age 
 
Associate Professor Andrew Beale OBE 
Director of IP Wales® & Member of the International Institute of Shipping & Trade Law 
 
Sue Ratcliffe 
Swansea University 
 
Professor Andrew Tettenborn 
Member of the International Institute of Shipping & Trade Law 
 
Legal protection of data 
 
If land was the primary raw material of the agricultural age and iron the original raw material 
for the industrial age then data, as information in digital form, is the fuel of the information 
age. Since its creation data usage and storage has grown exponentially and remains a 
modern-day phenomenon. On one estimation, at the turn of this Century only 25% of 
information was stored in digital form but in the present day that has increased to over 95%1 
with 90% of the world’s digital data only having been generated in the last few years2. 
                                            
1  James Manyika,  Michael Chui, Brad Brown, et al., “Big Data: The Next Frontier for 
Innovation, Competition, and Productivity,” McKinsey Global Institute, May 2011, 
http://wwwmckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/big_datathe_next_frontier_for_inno
vation, cited in Alec Ross, The Industries of the future  (Simon & Schuster 2016) 154. 
2  “Big Data, for Better or Worse: 90% of World’s Data Generated over Last Two 
years, ”Science Daily, May 22, 2013, 
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Understanding, analysing and forecasting from copious amounts of data is the role of Big 
Data3, which enables us to examine in both smaller detail and larger scale than ever before. 
 
The relevance of legal protection is limited. Just as good locks do more than any number of 
theft or burglary laws, the first line of defence for any firm concerned to safeguard its data, 
and especially its trade secrets, is physical measures. Any sensible business must take 
steps to make it less likely that their data will be compromised by prying eyes, computer 
hackers, cyber-pirates and all the myriad of other hazards inherent in the knowledge 
economy. So too with straightforward measures by a business to prevent its workers and 
collaborators from abstracting its data – especially undetectably – for their own benefit, or 
for that of third party competitors who might be prepared to pay generously for it. Such 
matters as copy protection for important documents and proper logging of all access to keys, 
swipe-cards and sensitive areas on a firm's server are vital4. 
  
                                            
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/05/130522085217.htm., cited in Alec Ross, 
The Industries of the future  (Simon Schuster 2016) 154. 
3      Also known as Big Data Analytics, Analytics or Deep Analytics. The term as 
used in this sense seems to have originated in the 1990s: see The Origins of ‘Big Data': 
An Etymological Detective Story, by Steve Lohr, which appeared in the op-ed column of 
the New York Times for February 1, 2013. 
4 This will become slightly more important if and when the EU Trade Secrets Directive 
referred to below becomes law in the UK: under the Directive, a trade secret eligible for 
protection must have “been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the 
person lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret” (Art.2(1)(c)). 
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What is also necessary, however, is a simple and straightforward background of legal 
protection when things go wrong and data is misused or ends up in the wrong hands. 
Simplicity and predictability are particularly important here. Start-ups and Small-Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs) tend to have relatively low capital bases, and a correspondingly large 
proportion of their exploitable assets tied up in manufacturing or commercial secrets and 
similar intangibles. They are just the firms who cannot afford to divert large sums to legal 
advice and litigation over obscure legal provisions relating to the protection of these assets. 
 
Since 1995 a minimum legal standard of protection for intellectual property has been 
prescribed for all member States of the World Trade Organization 5  under the TRIPS 
agreement 6  . Under Article 39, what is referred to as “undisclosed information” 7  is 
recognised as an undefined category of ‘intellectual property”, protectable not on the basis 
of its content, be it in digital form or otherwise, but by reason of its commercial worth and  
“undisclosed” nature. Based on the provisions of U.S. Uniform Trade Secrets Act of 19858 
                                            
5 A category covering virtually all the world's major trading states, including all of Europe 
(apart from the Vatican). 
6 More precisely, the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights. Its aim is to provide for minimum levels of cross-border protection for intellectual 
property rights within the context of the WTO trade regime. 
7      Often also called “trade secrets” or “know-how”. 
8 Uniform Acts in the US context have no legal force of their own. They are merely texts 
produced by a semi-private body of lawyers and professors, the Uniform Law 
Commission (established in 1892), for possible State adoption in State legislation. The 
text of the 1985 Uniform Act, which updates a previous draft of 1979 and has been widely 
adopted by State legislatures, is available online at 
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the Article sets as the conditions for protection: it must be secret, possess a commercial 
value, be the subject of reasonable steps (in the circumstances) to remain secret. Whilst the 
Article’s negotiation led to legal debate about whether trade secrets could be considered 
“property” under law, the issue was deftly avoided by adopting the European proposal to link 
the protection with unfair competition under Article 10bis of the Paris Convention,9 already 
adopted into TRIPS under Article 2. It remains, however, that there can only be “possession” 
or de facto “control” of data as “undisclosed information” as opposed to legal “ownership”10. 
Further protection is also afforded under the Article to “undisclosed test or other data” for 
the pharmaceutical and agrochemical industries, provided the origination of the data has 
involved “considerable effort”11. Only a few countries had developed legal rules to protect 
test data before the TRIPS negotiations, so again heavy reliance was placed on the U.S. 
position and its recognition of data exclusivity12. The Article is accordingly protective of test 
data where its submission is required for marketing authorization, is not publicly available 
and refers to a “new chemical entity”. 
                                            
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trade%20secrets/utsa_final_85.pdf [consulted 
7 December 2016].  
9 That is, the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as 
subsequently amended. 
10    J.H.Reichman, Universal minimum standards of intellectual property protection 
under the TRIPS component of the WTO Agreement, The International Lawyer 1995, vol. 
29, No. 2, p.378, cited in UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development 
(Cambridge University Press 2005) 521. 
11     Article 39.3. 
12     See Zhiwen, L. 2014. TRIPS – Plus Protection on Drug Innovation under US 
FTAs. Journal of Comparative Law, 1, p.010. 
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In addition to being the first international convention to impose specific legal protection on 
undisclosed information, including test data, TRIPS also requires protection for the 
“compilations of data or other material, whether in machine readable or other form…Such 
protection, which shall not extend to the data or material itself, shall be without prejudice to 
any copyright subsisting in the data or material itself”13. But whereas the Berne Convention14 
requires originality in the selection “and” arrangement of collections for copyright protection, 
TRIPS only requires originality in the selection “or” arrangement for database protection as 
an intellectual creation, irrespective of whether copyright already protects individual parts of 
that creation or not15. It should be noted however that “copyright protection for compilations 
of data has different economic and social implications to the sui generis right currently in 
place in the European Union…designed to protect a particular kind of investment (i.e.  
primarily economic) with a view to encouraging optimal levels of production of databases”16. 
 
 
How is data defined? 
 
                                            
13     Article 10.2. 
14 The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886, as 
subsequently amended. This Convention is the bedrock of most international copyright 
protection. 
15    UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development (Cambridge 
University Press 2005) 164. 
16    UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development (Cambridge 
University Press 2005) 170. 
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So how is “data’ defined under the laws of England and Wales? The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines “data” as an item, or collection of items, of information.17  The definition 
of data as being “information” also neatly corresponds to its treatment in the Data Protection 
Act 1998, where data is defined as information which inter alia includes information that:  
(a) is being processed by means of equipment operating automatically in response to 
instructions given for that purpose,  
(b) is recorded with the intention that it should be processed by means of such equipment,  
(c) is recorded as part of a relevant filing system or with the intention that it should form part 
of a relevant filing system. 
  
This definition, even though the 1998 Act is not directly relevant to commercial information,18 
is nevertheless helpful and informative. It is clear from it that data which is in existence is 
covered by headings (b) and (c), since it is or has been recorded with a view to it being 
processed. However, if we look at heading (a) the definition of data also covers information 
that is undergoing processing. Processing information is done by computer equipment using 
algorithms to extract content and useful material from existing information/data and 
incorporate it into some form of use to the party processing it, such as a filing system or 
CAD application. Therefore, processed data is just as much to be classified as “data” as raw 
information is. The pre-existing data could exist on one set of servers then be processed 
                                            
17 The relevant parts of the definition are as follows: “1. As a count noun: an item of 
information; a datum; a set of data …. 2. As a mass noun. a. Related items of (chiefly 
numerical) information considered collectively, typically obtained by scientific work and 
used for reference, analysis, or calculation …”. 
18 Its aim being essentially to protect personal data on individuals from misuse or unjustified 
disclosure. 
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and communicated to, say, a server belonging to a third party, such as Amazon, or a “cloud” 
provider, who hold data for its customers. The data that could be collected is vast ranging 
from customer information and transactional histories to experimental results and clinical 
research data. Particularly useful data is collected through cookies on web sites as to buying 
patterns of individuals, web-sites visited and products reviewed and this data can then be 
processed to form new data which can all be used for target marketing. Clinical data, which 
again is often based on patient data that has been processed, for example by anonymizing, 
and this processed data is particularly valuable in that it is used to support the Regulatory 
approval of new drugs. Therefore it is clear that data as defined by the Data Protection Act 
covers information that has considerable value. However, the Data Protection Act relates to 
personal information relating to an individual rather than data per se which could be 
company information that not necessarily relates to an individual, for example anonymised 
patient data. 
 
 
The available legal protection 
 
How well, then, is data legally protected in England and Wales? In theory, the answer is that 
civil law protection is good: so much so that in 2014 the House of Commons' European 
Scrutiny Committee claimed that, apart from a technical point on limitation law, our law 
already conformed with the then draft of what is now the EU Trade Secrets Directive19. 
                                            
19 Formally, Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Commission on the protection of 
undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful 
acquisition, use and disclosure, was adopted by the European Parliament and the 
Council on the 8th June 2016 as requires EU countries to bring into force the requisite  
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In summary, the scheme is as follows. 
  
First, in common with most other legal systems, English law unequivocally imposes on 
anyone directly entrusted with confidential data, whether worker 20  or independent 
contractor21, an implicit duty owed to the entruster in contract not to misuse it22. Anyone 
guilty of breaking that duty is liable in damages for all the foreseeable consequences of that 
breach23, and can equally be prevented by injunction from misusing it24. Anyone knowingly 
suborning another to break this contractual duty, or receiving information from someone who 
they know is breaking it by revealing the information, is liable in tort for inducing breach of 
contract25. Furthermore, so long as such data remains confidential and cannot be regarded 
as having entered the public domain, anyone in possession of it who knows its origin can 
                                            
laws and administrative provisions by 9th June 2018. Following a change in the draft, 
the limitation point has since fallen by the wayside. 
20 Stemming from the early decisions in Lamb v Evans [1893] 1 QB 218 and Robb v 
Green [1895] 2 Q.B. 315; F.Gurry, Breach of Confidence (2nd ed), Chap. 12. 
21 See the early case of Mechanical & General Inventions Co Ltd v Austin [1935] A.C. 
346; F.Gurry, Breach of Confidence (2nd ed), Chap. 13. 
22 See generally F.Gurry, Breach of Confidence (2nd ed), Chap. 4. 
23 F.Gurry, Breach of Confidence (2nd ed), Chap. 19. 
24 F.Gurry, Breach of Confidence (2nd ed), Chap. 18. 
25 F.Gurry, Breach of Confidence (2nd ed), paras.2.120 ff. 
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equally be prevented in equity from using it and may be liable in compensation if he does 
so26. 
 
Secondly, subject to the limits on contractual freedom imposed by the doctrine of restraint 
of trade27, express contractual protection can also effectively restrict the uses to which data 
can be put. Hence where an airline puts details of its flights on its website, it can legitimately 
prevent “screen-scraping” by other merchandisers and aggregators for their own purposes28, 
even where no other independent intellectual property is available and thus the information 
would otherwise be subject to a free-for-all29. 
  
Thirdly, the English law of tort is strong – perhaps one of the strongest in the world – on the 
protection of tangible property. This can be surprisingly important for the protection of data 
generally. Most obviously, the law of trespass covers all physical incursions on property, 
                                            
26 For the development of this jurisdiction, see Breach of Confidence (2nd ed), paras.2.005 
ff. 
27 See Chitty on Contracts (32nd ed), paras.16-085 ff. 
28 For an instance of a claim of this sort, see the Irish decision in Ryanair Ltd v Bravofly Ltd 
[2016] IESC 53 (a case still in the preliminary stage). Note that restrictions of this sort 
are permissible under EU intellectual property law, even where data is otherwise outside 
IP protection: see the decision of the ECJ in Ryanair Ltd v PR Aviation BV [2015] 2 
C.M.L.R. 36. 
29 This is permissible under EU intellectual property law because of the decision of the ECJ 
in Ryanair Ltd v PR Aviation BV [2015] 2 C.M.L.R. 36. 
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whether real30 or personal31. It follows that where a defendant enters a part of premises 
where he is not permitted to be, or physically accesses some tangible medium containing 
data, any losses suffered as a result are compensable 32 , including presumably those 
stemming from the loss or taking of the intangible data there33. Indeed, it may well be that 
liability goes even further than this and extends to any unauthorised access, whether directly 
or via cyberspace, to a computer in a claimant's possession34. If this is right, it provides a 
cast-iron legal means of redress in respect of most pilfering of data, whether secret or not 
(for example, information aggregated on computer storage where it is clear that no consent 
is given to its wholesale use by a competitor)35. 
  
                                            
30 Where the cause of action is trespass to land: Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (21st ed), 
Chap. 19. 
31 In the case of trespass to goods: Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (21st ed), Paras.17-131 ff. 
32 Pritchard v Long (1842) 9 M & W 666 (semble). A more colourful example is 
Bracegirdle v Orford (1813) 2 M & S 77. 
33 Compare the decision in White v Withers LLP [2009] EWCA Civ 1122; [2010] 1 F.L.R. 
859 (not on commercial information but still in point). 
34 For the authorities, see Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (21st ed), Paras.17-135-136. The 
limitation to a machine or server in the claimant's possession is important. In so far as 
data is kept in the 'cloud', then it is suggested that the only liability in trespass is to the 
owner of the server unless access was gained physically via the victim's own machine. 
35 Compare the American decisions in eBay Inc v Bidder’s Edge Inc, 100 F.Supp.2d 1058 
(N.D. Cal. 2000) and Snap-On Business Solutions Inc v O'Neil & Associates Inc, 708 
F.Supp.2d 669 (2010). 
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Fourthly, it is now clear that English law protects against the wrongful alienation of 
transferable rights, including it seems intellectual property rights. It has to be remembered 
that ownership of such rights may be transferred in fraud of the owner. For example, a senior 
rogue employee or consultant armed with ostensible authority to deal with the Intellectual 
Property Office might quite easily cause the rights to a complex registered design right to be 
transferred to a series of third parties36. As regards anyone knowingly responsible for such 
a transfer and in addition any recipient who knows or has good reason to know of the 
irregularity, the owner has a claim for damages37. 
  
Apart from the above, we can of course add “front-line”, overtly IP-based, protections. Two 
of these are essentially EU-based (and therefore, unless and until Brexit becomes a reality, 
beyond UK or Welsh government control). One, surprisingly important in practice, is the 
already referenced database right38, partly overlapping with copyright (in cases where there 
                                            
36 A simple enough process: the transfer form, Design Form DF12A, is a mere page-and-
a half long and takes about two minutes to complete, with (it seems) only a limited 
check on authenticity. Theoretically the same thing could happen with copyright, though 
it is less likely. 
37 Armstrong DLW GmbH v Winnington Networks Ltd [2012] EWHC 10 (Ch); [2013] Ch. 
156 (actually about another form of intangible rights, but the reasoning equally would 
apply to intellectual property rights). 
38 See the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, ss.3A, 50D, 296B, embodying in the 
law of England and Wales Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases. 
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is an evident high degree of human ingenuity and originality)39, but going a good deal beyond 
it, so as to protect from copying and publication40 any collection of information41 involving a 
substantial investment of effort in research or data gathering42. Admittedly the protection this 
gives may be limited; for example it would not, it seems, cover computerised stores of raw 
scientific research data, nor yet basic production figures or details of manning levels or profit 
forecasts43. Nevertheless, once a degree of processing of the data has intervened, then 
protection automatically kicks in. Thus, it is suggested that the Database Directive44 is likely 
                                            
39 Note that this is a more exacting requirement than the requirement for copyright 
generally in common law countries, where not a great deal of intellectual input is 
required for copyright to subsist: a point well made in the December 2005 DG Internal 
Market and Services Working Paper (First evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC on the legal 
protection of databases), paras.1-2. 
40 Database Directive, Art.7.1. 
41 Whether electronic or not: see Database Directive, Art.1.2 (“collection of independent 
works, data or other materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way and 
individually accessible by electronic or other means”). 
42 See Database Directive, Art.7 (requirement for “qualitatively and/or quantitatively a 
substantial investment in either the obtaining, verification or presentation of the 
contents”).  
43 Because of the CJEU's decision in British Horseracing Board Ltd v William Hill 
Organization Ltd (Case C-203/02) [2005] 1 C.M.L.R. 15, excluding data not gathered, 
but actually produced, by the database holder (there the names of horses entered for 
races). 
44  It is often the case that value in data lies in the way it is formulated into a database 
and its ease of extraction from that database. This is certainly the case if the data is from 
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to provide a potentially useful level of protection in respect of such “added-value” business 
tools as production analyses, financial spreadsheets and itemised customer lists45. Again, 
for those businesses involved in the development of computer hardware, another 
                                            
public record sources that are available for anyone to extract that piece of data. However, 
where information is extracted and processed to form data as defined in the Data 
Protection Act then there is arguably value in this data as added value has been given to 
the data by processing it. The processed data may be information about an individual and 
their buying habits which could have considerable value for a marketing company. 
Although a database of such information is valuable there is also value in the individual 
data. If this information can be connected to an individual its use is curtailed via the Data 
Protection Act but should the data become anonymised or not relate to an individual per se 
then there is little protection for anyone creating the data beyond the use of trade secrets. 
It is clear from case law such as William Hill (see footnote above) that individual data is 
treated very differently from the database. Also, if there is not a high enough level or 
originality to attract copyright protection again there is no protection for the data itself 
unless it can be viewed as being a substantial part of the database. Although the EU had 
the intention of harmonising laws under the Directive, infringement issues are decided 
according to national law, so if data is being transmitted overseas or uploaded onto 
external servers the effect of database rights under the Directive may be limited.  
45 See British Sky Broadcasting Group Plc v Digital Satellite Warranty Cover Ltd (In 
Liquidation) [2011] EWHC 2662 (Ch); [2012] F.S.R. 14 and Flogas Britain Ltd v Calor 
Gas Ltd [2013] EWHC 3060 (Ch); [2014] F.S.R. 34. 
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specialised example is a limited protection accorded to certain kinds of computer chip 
design46. 
  
The database right aside, in practice the law of copyright is also extremely important as a 
protector of data. This is for several reasons. One is that, while it is possible to abstract or 
misuse data by reading, memorising and utilising it, the vast majority of data misuse in 
practice involves copying, whether cut-and-paste on a screen or scanning a piece of paper. 
The second is that a major subject of data breach, computer software, is by universal 
consent (and EU law47) the subject of copyright48. Thirdly, despite the adage that there is no 
copyright in ideas but only in their expression, English and Welsh copyright in practice 
protects almost any written document, including a document on a computer disk drive, of 
any length. In contrast to the situation with (say) German law49, which explicitly requires a 
                                            
46 Which applies a modified version of Part III of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
1988 to such items: see the Design Right (Semiconductor Topographies) Regulations, 
SI 1989/1100 and the Amendment Regulations of 2006, SI 2006/1833. The source is 
Euro-law: see Council Directive 87/54/EC. 
47 See the Software Directive 2009 (Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs). 
48 Generally W.Cornish, D.Lewellyn & T.Aplin, Intellectual Property (8th ed) Chap.20. 
49     It is worthy of note that Chinese IP laws from the mid 1980s were modelled on the 
German Civil Law IP system. 
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degree of personal creativity50, the requirement for originality or intellectual input is minimal51. 
And lastly, as before there is no difficulty in holding a copyright infringer liable for damages 
for any consequential losses resulting from the breach52. No wonder, then, that many 
commercial claims for abstraction of information or data are framed as claims for breach of 
copyright as well as for breach of confidence. 
  
So far so good. What is less satisfactory as regards the law of England and Wales is the 
issue of certainty and accessibility. In some cases the problem is technical. For example, 
the nature of the remedy for breach of confidence – not technically a claim for damages but 
for equitable compensation – creates a peculiarity on the European level as regards 
jurisdiction against defendants domiciled elsewhere in the EU53. More to the point, however, 
is the law's lack of accessibility to even a reasonably well-educated layperson or business 
owner. True, classic rights such as copyright are now codified, albeit in the Copyright, 
Designs and Patents Act 1988, a statute of great complexity, and some answers are 
                                            
50 See Urheberrechtsgesetz, §2.2 (protected works stated to be nur persönliche geistige 
Schöpfungen); generally, E.Rosati, “Towards an EU-wide copyright? (Judicial) pride and 
(legislative) prejudice” [2013] I.P.Q. 47. 
51 W.Cornish, D.Lewellyn & T.Aplin, Intellectual Property (8th ed) Para.11-08. 
52 H.Laddie, P.Prescott & M.Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright, Para.39.40. 
53 Put briefly, a trade secret owner can always sue here for an infringement in England if it 
amounts to a breach of contract or tort: Brussels I, Art.5. But if he has to sue for breach 
of confidence and the defendant is domiciled elsewhere in the EU he has to sue there 
under the residual Art.4. See Kitechnology BV v Unicor GmbH Plastmaschinen [1994] 
I.L.Pr. 568; [1995] F.S.R. 765; Vidal-Hall v Google Inc [2015] EWCA Civ 311; [2015] 3 
W.L.R. 409 at [46]. 
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available after a fashion to anyone prepared to plough through it and the parallel EU 
legislation. But elsewhere matters are less straightforward. Take, for example, the rules 
protecting trade secrets under contract law and breach of confidence. None of this is codified 
at all; to understand them the manager of a SME either has to have them summarised by 
his lawyer, or to plough through a welter of case-law or a practitioner's text-book. To take as 
one instance the contractual duty of an employee, what can be gleaned from the decided 
cases is that this consists, fairly vaguely, of an implied term against disloyalty. This may of 
course include copying or memorising trade secrets with a view to using them for one's own 
benefit or that of another, and in certain cases actually using them, but subject to the 
qualification that fair competition is allowed, including making preparations during 
employment for competitive activities to be undertaken after it. Again, the equitable doctrine 
of breach of confidence is not much more precise. There must, it seems, be a piece of 
information 54 , or at least an idea or concept, with some degree of originality 55  and 
exactitude56, and not in the public domain, in the sense of being relatively easily available 
to anyone who cares to look for it57. And there must have been disclosure in confidence, an 
                                            
54 Which may of course exist in nature as much as in human expression: for instance, a 
cutting containing DNA (as in the Australian decision in Franklin v Giddins [1977] Qd.R. 
72). A sample of a drink made according to a secret formula would be a good example. 
55 And not something entirely banal or trivial: Deloitte & Touche LLP v Dickson [2005] 
EWHC 721 (Ch) at [38] (Laddie J). 
56 A vague plan or imprecise concept will not do: eg De Maudsley v Palumbo [1996] 
E.M.L.R. 460 and Sales v Stromberg [2006] F.S.R. 7. 
57 F.Gurry, Breach of Confidence (2nd ed), paras.5.14 ff; Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No.6) [2005] 
EWCA Civ 595; [2006] Q.B. 125 at [105] (Phillips MR). 
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obtaining by reprehensible means58, or an incidental obtaining of obviously confidential 
material59. The position of third party recipients of secrets remains obscure. While they can 
probably be prevented from using information if they knew it was secret when they got it or 
if they received it gratuitously, there is no unequivocal indication what the position is if they 
have paid for it in all innocence60.  The matter is further complicated by the existence of a 
number of overriding defences, such as reverse engineering and a general public interest 
defence. 
  
Compare this with other jurisdictions. In Germany, for example, despite complaints from 
German lawyers about its untidiness, most of the law on trade secrets appears clearly and 
succinctly in three sections of the Unfair Competition Law, taking up about 500 words61. 
                                            
58 Such as theft (as in Franklin v Giddins [1977] Qd.R. 72), phone-tapping (Francome v 
Mirror Group Ltd [1984] 1 W.L.R. 892), or illicit photography in a private place contrary to 
a clearly enforced ban (as in Creation Records Ltd v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1997] 
E.M.L.R. 444 or OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21; [2008] 1 A.C. 1 (as regards Douglas 
v Hello! Ltd).  
59 For example, a document marked “Private” blown out of a window (see Lord Goff in 
Spycatcher [1990] 1 A.C. 190, 281) or a clearly mistaken delivery (English & American 
Insurance Co Ltd v Herbert Smith [1988] F.S.R. 232). 
60 F.Gurry, Breach of Confidence (2nd ed), Paras.7.122 ff; P.Stanley, The Law of 
Confidentiality: A Restatement, Chapter 19; D.Vaver, Reforming intellectual property law: 
an obvious and not-so-obvious agenda: the Stephen Stewart Lecture for 2008 2009 IPQ 
143, 157. 
61 UWG (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb), §§ 17-19. This is admittedly not the 
only source of the law: the general contractual duty of good faith may also be invoked on 
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These ban, in simple terms, the misappropriation of secret data by employees, its dishonest 
abstraction, receipt or exploitation by third parties, its misuse by those entrusted with it, and 
the suborning of others to divulge it. Infringement is a crime and a tort62. Again, in the US 
too the matter is largely codified (although a few states still rely on common law protection, 
with all the disadvantages this entails).  As regards state law, most states have adopted the 
Uniform Law Commission's Uniform Trade Secrets Act, dating from 1979 and updated in 
198563. This is a relatively short provision, running to six substantive sections64, which 
having defined a trade secret widely65 creates a general right to damages and injunctions in 
                                            
occasion to protect secrets, and explicit non-disclosure agreements are common. 
Nevertheless, the UWG is a good start. 
62 A tort because the Civil Code (BGB), §823.2, provides that criminal prohibitions aimed at 
protecting third party interests (Schutznormen) give rise to civil liability in so far as 
infringed deliberately or culpably. 
63 Text available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trade%20secrets/utsa_final_85.pdf [consulted 
7 December 2016]. For an example of a state enactment of it see Connecticut General 
Statutes, § 35-50 to 35-58. A few states have their own legislation: e.g. Massachusetts 
General Laws, Ch.93, §§ 42-42A (1993). 
64 Technically it has 12 sections, but the final six deal with ancillary matters such as its 
relationship with other laws, the need for uniform construction, etc.. 
65 See s.1(4) (“information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, 
method, technique, or process, that (i) derives independent economic value, actual or 
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by 
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or 
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respect of appropriation by unlawful or unfair means66. Parallel to this, at the federal level 
trade secrets related to products or services used in interstate or foreign commerce are 
protected by the Economic Espionage Act 1996 (as amended)67. This provision, again fairly 
short and straightforward, is mainly aimed at making abstraction of such trade secrets a 
crime68, but incidentally also creates a right to injunction and damages69. 
 
  
Looking to the future 
 
Will the matter be improved with the new Trade Secrets Directive 70 , a minimum 
harmonisation proposal for the civil law? It has been suggested that English law already 
complies with the Directive anyway71; but this complacency might be misplaced, and at least 
some small changes may be required: for instance, an explicit requirement that to be 
protected the holder of a secret must be shown to have taken reasonable steps to protect it, 
                                            
use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to 
maintain its secrecy.”). 
66 See ss.3-4. 
67 See 18 USC §§ 1831 et seq. 
68 18 USC § 1832.  § 1831 provides for increased penalties where the secret is abstracted 
for the benefit of a foreign organisation. 
69 18 USC § 1836. 
70 Directive (EU) 2016/943 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business 
information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure. 
71 See the Commons European Scrutiny Committee discussion of the Directive in its thirty-
sixth report for 2013-2014, 12 February 2014 (HC 83-xxxiii, Chapter 3). 
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and a limitation on the compensation that can be awarded against an innocent infringer. 
More to the point, however, the Directive may well as a codifying measure improve matters 
as regards accessibility. For example, what counts as a “trade secret” is defined; the acts 
amounting to infringement are described in detail; it is made clear that a remedy is available 
even against good faith purchasers of a trade secret; defences such as disclosure in the 
public interest, and workers' rights to make use of acquired skills, are expressly provided for; 
minimum remedies are laid down; and so on. Admittedly there are some difficulties, in 
particular as regards remedies. The measure of damages, for example, is unclear. In 
principle this is based squarely on loss72, which is appropriate in the context of commercial 
information. But the waters are then muddied. “Moral prejudice” is to be compensable73, 
which seems odd in the context of a measure aimed at the protection of commercial 
information. Furthermore, there is a requirement to take account of “any unfair profits made 
by the infringer”74, which seems to take the remedy away from compensation and closer to 
an account of profits. Furthermore, there is a provision that should worry any SME 
concerned for its cash-flow and financial planning. The power of a court to refuse an 
injunction against the use of a trade secret on the grounds of hardship (“disproportionate 
harm”) is preserved75: but there are two stings in the tail. First there is a strict requirement 
that at the time of use of the trade secret the defendant neither knew nor ought to have 
known of any prior wrongful dealings; and secondly it seems that a defendant seeking to 
avail itself of this exception must be prepared to pay a licence fee for the whole time during 
                                            
72 See Art.14(1) (“… damages appropriate to the actual prejudice suffered as a result of the 
unlawful acquisition, use or disclosure of the trade secret. ...”). 
73 Art.14(2). 
74 Art.14(2). 
75 Art.13(3). 
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which it has used the trade secret. In short, a defendant which has in all innocence invested 
substantial sums in establishing a line of business is likely to be faced with the unenviable 
choice between either writing it off or paying considerable back royalties for the entire period 
it has been using the secret in question. A more effective discouragement to innovation 
would be difficult to imagine. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In large measure the existing legal protection of trade secrets data is limited due to a low 
level of legal protection76, issues of legal fragmentation both across and within differing legal 
jurisdictions around the world and problems associated with poor civil redress and criminal 
enforcement, including a failure to protect the confidentiality of trade secrets during legal 
proceedings. Difficulties in finding an agreed understanding of “trade secrets” and “know-
how” resulted in TRIPS adopting the more neutral term “undisclosed information”, whilst at 
the same time refusing to offer any legal definition as to its meaning. In consequence, a 
recent study by the World Trade Organization has found that legal protection of confidential 
information in its member states today derives from over 25 different fields of law 77 . 
                                            
76     Trade secrets are non-exclusive, so it is not a misappropriation to independently 
discover the secret information or otherwise reverse engineer it from a properly obtained 
source. Moreover, trade secrets have been described as “too slippery” for any higher legal 
protection because information is not treated in law as property - see Robin Jacob, Daniel 
Alexander QC & Matthew Fisher: Guide book to intellectual property (6th Edition Hart 
Publishing 2013) 205. 
77  WIPO (2013) Survey on Technology Transfer Agreements and Antitrust. Geneva. 
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Moreover, TRIPS was negotiated at a time when the usage and storage of digital data was 
in its infancy, a global economy underpinned by employee mobility was still in creation and 
the notion of globally dispersed research and development (R&D) driven by what was to 
become known as “open innovation” remained still to be undiscovered by the boards of most 
large multi-national corporations. A Report78 published by the World Intellectual Property 
Organization in 2015 would suggest that until the global community addresses the issue of 
legal fragmentation it will remain a largely unsatisfactory civil law environment for Start-ups 
and SMEs, which are heavily reliant on their trade secrets and know-how79, to be expected 
to grow their businesses within the global economy. So does the protection of sensitive data 
fare any better under the criminal law?  
 
Lord Boyle has noted sardonically, “it is not too much to say that we live in a country 
where…the theft of the board room table is punished far more severely than the theft of the 
board room secrets”80. This situation is in marked contrast to the US where the Economic 
                                            
78          WIPO (2015) Private International Law Issues in Online Intellectual Property 
Infringement Disputes with Cross-Border Elements 
 
79  QED Intellectual Property (2003) Evaluation and Validation of Intellectual Property 
by IP Wales Grant Award Candidates – commenting on the finding that respondent 
companies only identified 14% of their IP to be know-how & 7% trade secret the authors 
concluded, “we would have expected to see know-how showing a higher percentage than 
patents (35%), as SME’s typically trade on their know-how and levels of expertise. This 
perhaps suggests that the respondents may undervalue their know-how (& trade secrets, 
given all patentable inventions essentially begin their life as trade secrets – see Pooley, 
1997), possibly because it does not represent formal IP like a patent or trade mark. 
80  Legislating the Criminal Code: Misuse of Trade Secrets consultation paper 
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/wp-
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Espionage Act 1996 (as amended) contains a separate provision to criminalise the 
commercial theft of trade secrets and preserve their confidential integrity during any criminal 
proceedings81. Nevertheless, the storing and processing of digital information on external 
servers, which allows trade secret theft to be initiated from anywhere in the world is a 
growing threat under IP cybercrime82 and adds a third dimension to online IP crime, which 
has traditionally been viewed as just combating counterfeiting and piracy83. The growing 
threat of IP cybercrime led in 2013 to the UK Intellectual Property Office funding PIPCU [City 
of London Police Intellectual Property Crime Unit]. Whilst PIPCU has reported success in 
disrupting borderless online IP crime84 it recognises that it cannot hope to eradicate it 
because equally mobile cybercriminals reside outside its territorial competence (and, as 
                                            
content/uploads/2015/03/cp150_Legislating_the_Criminal_Code_Misuse_of_Trade_Secret
s_Consultation.pdf (accessed 24/8/16). 
81          See 18 USC §§ 1832 & 1835. 
 
82  Jennifer Brant and Sebastian Lohse, Trade Secrets: Tools for Innovation and 
Collaboration [2014] International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 5. 
83  “Whereas online trade mark abuses (e.g. counterfeit goods) and copyright 
infringements (e.g. illegal downloads) are well documented our understanding of the 
relevance of the linkage between IP Crime & eCrime to the SME sector (e.g. the taking of 
confidential information) is still in its relative infancy” -  Jane Foulser McFarlane, Legal 
Counsel for IP to the National Assembly for Wales (2009), Report Prepared for the Welsh 
Assembly Government on IP Crime & E Crime (IP Wales) 3. 
84  Under Operation Creative an Infringing Website List (IWL) was created resulting by 
2015 in a 73% drop in advertising commissioned on copyright infringing websites. 
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often as not, outside the EU)85. So for the present, at least, tangible measures remain the 
primary effective mechanism for the protection of data in our digital age for the majority of 
Start-ups and SMEs.  
 
The growing fondness for storing and processing sensitive data in the ‘cloud’ raises 
important issues of cybersecurity and inappropriate access by third parties. However, recent 
research commissioned by Trend Micro would suggest that the vast majority of Sstart-ups 
and SMEs are currently operating in ignorance of the threat posed86. This research finding 
resonates with earlier research commissioned from IP Wales by the Welsh Government 
which concluded that “the lack of awareness of security risks… is astonishing in a digital 
age, which boasts a high level of sophisticated IT crime”87. The threat currently confronting 
                                            
85  See Rob Mackinlay, ‘Disrupting borderless online IP crime’ (CILIP Update March 
2016) 39. 
86  Vital Statistics on behalf of Trend Micro (August 2015) – “In the United Kingdom, as 
in many other economies around the world, smaller businesses are the lifeblood of national 
prosperity. In essence SMEs ‘are’ the private sector, according to the Department for 
Business, Innovation & Skills, they employ more people (60% in the UK in 2014) and 
generate almost half the total turnover of the private sector (48% in the UK in 2014)…We 
interviewed 500 key decision makers and business owners in UK SMEs to compile the 
research. Amazingly, only half of them said they rely on internet security tools…Three-
quarters (74%) admitted to not fully understanding the legal implications of a 
cyberattack…Tellingly just 18% said they thought their data was worth stealing”. 
87  Jane Foulser McFarlane, Legal Counsel for IP to the National Assembly for Wales 
(2011), Intellectual Property Rights Infringement and Enforcement Issues in IP Wales 
Funded Businesses (IP Wales) Conclusion para. 7. 
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Start-ups and SMEs largely consists of three main types of cyberattack one of which, 
Network Confidentiality, specifically targets trade secret data. 
 
We have already referencedpointed out  the familiar value of a secure lock to protect the 
tangible property of a business, this being and this is often supplemented by a burglar alarm. 
But, but unlike the burglar alarm which can only alerts the business to an intrusion and 
possibly scare the intruders offhopefully deters, cybersecurity can proactively protect the 
intellectual assets of a business by blocking the majority of intrusions into the network before 
they happeninfection. It can rapidly detect and remediate any infection which has already 
infiltrated the network. It can also stop data breaches from lost or stolen end points (desktops, 
laptops, tablets, smartphones, USB sticks etc.); safeguard online financial transactions; 
secure password management; and manage back-ups. It can even pre-empt future data 
attacks via automated risk assessments.  
 
As mission critical as passive cybersecurity protection measures may be for any IP- active 
business with an online presence, few Start-ups or SMEs will find themselves in the 
financial position to be able to afford the type of expensive cybersecurity protection that 
governments and multi-national corporations can afford. In this respect Alec Ross, Senior 
Advisor for Innovation to Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State notes cybersecurity “is 
supposed to be a public good administered by government, not a private good purchased 
in the marketplace…Government has a responsibility to protect its people, not just its big 
business and infrastructure…but there is an as yet unmet obligation by government to 
define its responsibilities to its citizens in this newest domain of conflict”88.  
 
                                            
88               Alec Ross, The Industries of the Future, (Simon & Schuster, 2016) 151. 
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At the time of writing it remains to be seen whether the UK government post B-rexit will 
continue to commit to inter-state co-operation on cybersecurity and the creation of an 
open, safe and secure cyberspace within Europe89. The creation in October 2016 of the 
UK’s first National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)90, committed to help make the UK “the 
safest place to live and do business online”91, broke new ground by additionally committing 
the UK to an “Active Cyber Defence” programme92. A Report published in the same month 
by the George Washington University Center for Cyber and Homeland Security (CCHS) 
noted that in terms of private sector active defence against cyberattack this now places the 
UK in comparison with the US, albeit with some “ambiguity at the tactical level”93 as to 
                                            
89             In May 2016 the European Council formally adopted new rules to step up the 
security of network and information systems across the EU under a network and information 
security (NIS) directive. The strategy has five priority areas: achieving cyber resilience; 
drastically reducing cybercrime; developing cyber defence policy and capabilities related to 
the EU’s common security and defence policy (CSDP); developing the industrial and 
technological resources for cyber security; establishing a coherent international cyberspace 
policy for the EU. 
90            Located in Victoria, London the Centre has a team of around 700 staff. 
91         Ciaran Martin, formerly Director General for cyber security at the UK 
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), inaugural Head of the UK National 
Cyber Security Centre. 
92        The NCSC has not publicly defined what it means by taking “specific action” with 
industry to address large-scale, non-sophisticated  
 
 cyberattacks. The full range of “active defence” measures goes from low risk 
information sharing to more extreme botnet takedowns and  
 
 white-hat ransomware retaliatory cyberattacks. 
 
93       Center for Cyber & Homeland Security, The George Washington University 
(Project Report October 2016) Into the Gray Zone –  
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what is legally permissible. Commenting on their Report the Associate Director CCHS and 
the Report’s Policy Analyst noted, “until significant consequences are visited upon 
perpetrators of threats there will be little incentive for them to change their ways. On the 
other hand, vigilantism, with the potential for expansive collateral damage, is not the 
answer94”. The current failure of international law to address the core legal principles which 
should govern “active defence”, the legal right to bare cyberarms if you will95, is no longer 
sustainable in a situation where the status quo favours no one more than the 
cyberattacker. 
 
                                            
 The Private Sector and Active Defense Against Cyber Threats 45. 
 
94      IPI Global Observatory Sharon L. Cardish and Taylor P. Brooks, Mounting an 
Active Defense Against  
 
 Cyber Threats, (10th November 2016) 2. 
 
95        See the prposed Active Cyber Defense Certainty Act, a draft US Bill to amend 
section 1030 of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act giving  
 
 private victims a retaliatory legal right to hack back their attacker, subject to prior 
notification of the FBI and avoiding the destruction of  
 
 data on third party’s networks or computers. 
